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ASK FOR HELP, UNCLE SAM:
THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL TAX REPORTING
SUSAN C. MORSE*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE problem of tax evasion on principal placed in, and income
earned from, offshore financial accounts is neither complicated nor
subtle as a matter of law. Many jurisdictions’ income tax laws require residents to pay income tax on income earned from such accounts even
though the accounts happen to be housed outside the taxing jurisdiction.1
But tax administrators lack the information necessary to enforce the law
with respect to offshore accounts. These accounts largely remain hidden
from tax administrators unless taxpayers self-report them. One estimate
puts the resulting worldwide annual revenue loss at $255 billion, based on
an assumption of $11.5 trillion total asset value in such accounts.2 Residence governments have strong incentives to address this information
problem, but banking jurisdictions, often historically committed to strong
bank secrecy laws, do not.3
Third-party reporting by the banks and other large intermediaries
that administer financial accounts solves the related information problem
for domestic accounts held by U.S. taxpayers. Banks send reports of investment returns, such as interest and dividend income and gross proceeds from the sale of securities, to the U.S. government and to U.S.
taxpayers.4 The compliance rate on such reported income exceeds ninetyfive percent.5
* Associate Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to Itai
Grinberg and Dick Harvey for helpful conversations and to the participants and
commentators at the Villanova Law Review Norman J. Shachoy Symposium held in
September 2011.
1. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 23 (2007) (“The residence rule [for
imposing income tax on individuals’ investment income] is so widely followed and
is incorporated into so many treaties that it can be considered part of customary
international law . . . .”).
2. See RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN Chavagneux, TAX HAVENS:
HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 61–64 (2010) (calculating $255 billion from
estimated total assets of $11.5 trillion, average annual return of 7.5%, or roughly
$860 billion, and average tax rate of 30%).
3. See Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV.
(manuscript at 54–85) (forthcoming 2012) (describing opposing automatic information reporting and anonymous withholding models).
4. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6042 (2006) (requiring dividend reporting); id. § 6045 (requiring gross proceeds reporting); id. § 6049 (requiring interest reporting).
5. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 179 (4th ed. 2008) (reporting ninety-six percent compliance rate for dividend and interest income in
United States, where reporting but not withholding requirements apply).
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An ongoing United States attempt to address the offshore account
problem exports the concept of third-party reporting by large intermediaries to the international context.6 The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act, or FATCA, requires “foreign financial institutions,” or
FFIs, to obtain and report information about U.S. account holders and
submit to certain audit requirements. Otherwise, the law provides for a
thirty percent withholding tax on U.S.-source portfolio income streams
and gross proceeds from the sale of certain securities that produce U.S.source portfolio income, regardless of whether those payments are made
to U.S. or non-U.S. accounts at the FFI.7 FATCA follows a bank-to-residence government, or B2G, approach to global information reporting.
The European Savings Directive, or EUSD, also addresses the problem of offshore accounts held by domestic resident taxpayers. The EUSD
uses a bank-to-bank jurisdiction-to-residence jurisdiction, or B2G2G, approach to global information reporting. Under the EUSD, a bank or
other “paying agent” within the jurisdiction of a participating state must
transfer information about interest payments made by the paying agent to
the government of the participating state, which then reports the interest
payment information to the government of residence of the beneficial
owner of the interest payment.8 A few countries, such as Luxembourg,
offer withholding at a rate of thirty-five percent rather than reporting.
Withholding instead of reporting maintains bank secrecy.9
The B2G approach of FATCA, which would cut non-U.S. governments
out of the information reporting chain, has the advantages of greater simplicity and more latitude to develop broad and innovative reporting strategies. But FATCA almost certainly cannot solve the problem of U.S.
taxpayers’ offshore accounts without the cooperation of non-U.S. governments. The United States will be reluctant to actually impose the statutory
withholding tax for capital markets and international relations reasons. In
addition, jurisdictional constraints and local legal constraints, including
bank secrecy laws, prevent the United States from building an adequate
method of ensuring the compliance of non-U.S. FFIs. Except to the extent that FFIs, their auditors, or both adopt FATCA compliance as a positive reputational signal,10 gaining the cooperation of non-U.S.
governments is an essential piece of a FATCA implementation strategy.
6. See generally J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of
FATCA and Its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012).
7. See I.R.C. § 1471.
8. See Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L157) 38 (EC).
9. See European Comm’n, Rules Applicable, TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/rules_applicable/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter EU Taxation of Savings: Rules Applicable] (describing scope of ESD and withholding option).
10. See Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675 (2012).
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A successful future for global information reporting based on the
FATCA model thus almost certainly requires the United States to enlist
non-U.S. governments.11 A 2012 framework devised by the United States
and five European countries that anticipates B2G2G reporting provides
one approach,12 which is formalized in U.S. model agreements featuring
reciprocal and non-reciprocal reporting.13 The United States and the UK
finalized the first bilateral agreement, including reciprocal B2G2G reporting, in September 2012.14 Other incremental steps toward multilateral cooperation also deserve consideration.
Part II of this Article describes the United States and European approaches to the problem of offshore accounts and cross-border information reporting. Part III explores three recommendations that would
further the important goal of gaining non-U.S. government cooperation
in the administration of the FATCA. In particular, Part III considers the
tactics of simplicity, reciprocity, and side payments.
II. UNITED STATES
A.

AND

EUROPEAN SOLUTIONS

The U.S. Approach: Bank-to-Residence Government

FATCA is a new solution to the old problem of U.S. domestic taxpayers evading tax on their income from offshore accounts.15 The recent
11. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REPORT OF THE INFORCONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES
AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS 16–21
(2009) [hereinafter OECD 2009 TRACE REPORT] (describing three approaches to
problem of cross-border reporting involving governments of residence jurisdiction, bank jurisdiction and source jurisdiction in different degrees).
12. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES,
FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, SPAIN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH TO IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTING FATCA (2012) [hereinafter FATCA 2012 FRAMEWORK JOINT STATEMENT].
13. See U.S. TREASURY, MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA (2012) [hereinafter “Reciprocal
Model Agreement”], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf; U.S. TREASURY, MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA (2012) [hereinafter “Nonreciprocal Model Agreement”], available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/nonreciprocal.pdf. See also Kristen A.
Parillo & Shamik Trivedi, IRS Releases First FATCA Model Agreement, 67 TAX NOTES
INT’L 497, 497 (Aug. 6, 2012) (distinguishing between reciprocal and nonreciprocal reporting model agreements).
14. See Marie Sapirie and Kristin Parillo, First FATCA Intergovernmental Agreement Signed With UK, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 1171 (Sept. 24, 2012); see also Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, Sept. 14, 2012 available at http:/
/www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCAAgreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-UK FATCA Agreement].
15. For example, the 1970 legislative history of the Bank Secrecy Act shows a
concern for tax evasion through offshore accounts. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-975
MAL
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path to FATCA’s enactment began around 2008, when the offshore account issue came into the public spotlight.16 The issue gained attention
after the U.S. “qualified intermediary” (“QI”) program for non-U.S. banks
revealed an enforcement problem for holders of offshore accounts.17
From 2000 on, many non-U.S. banks and other financial intermediaries18 have operated under QI agreements with the U.S. government.
The QI program primarily aims to ensure that the correct amount of tax is
collected when U.S.-source investment returns19 are paid to non-U.S. investors. A non-U.S. bank that agrees to act as a QI may forward to U.S.
intermediaries summary information about the treaty-based and other
withholding positions of its client base, keep secret the identity of its nonU.S. account holders, and achieve the desired result of reduced withholding on U.S.-source investment returns paid to its accounts held by nonU.S. investors.20
The QI program was not set up to provide information on U.S. investors to the U.S. government, despite the nominal requirement that QIs
disclose U.S. account holders.21 The model QI agreement did not provide significant withholding penalties for payments to undocumented accounts, most notably refraining from imposing withholding on gross sale
proceeds.22 It did not apply to accounts held by U.S. taxpayers if those
accounts did not produce U.S. source income.23 It permitted diligence
based on so-called “know your customer” rules developed to address
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4398 (“[I]t is grossly unfair to leave the
secret foreign bank account open as a convenient avenue of tax evasion.”). The
academic literature has considered this problem for some time. See, e.g., Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1669 (2000) (noting problems posed by bank secrecy law and
recommending an OECD-adopted uniform refundable withholding tax of “at least
40%”).
16. See Harvey, supra note 6, at 475–78 (describing 2008 Liechtenstein and
UBS scandals and contemporaneous Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing and report).
17. See generally Treas. Regs. § 1.1441-1 (1997).
18. Over 5,000 foreign banks, such as UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank,
have signed QI agreements with the United States. See Letter from N.Y. State Bar
Ass’n to Sen. Max Baucus et al. (Sept. 10, 2009), available at 2009 TNT 175-67.
19. These include interest and dividends paid on debt or equity issued by U.S.
corporations or the U.S. government. See I.R.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
20. See Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status: A New
U.S. Withholding Role for Foreign Financial Institutions Under Final U.S. Withholding
Regulations, 27 TAX MGM’T INT’L J. 331, 333–34 (1998) (explaining attempt to enlist QIs in project of ensuring correct withholding on payments of U.S. source
investment income to non-U.S. investors, in part by permitting QIs to maintain
customer confidentiality).
21. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000 C.B. 387 § 6.01 (requiring disclosure of U.S.
account holders).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5(d)(3)(ii) (2010).
23. See Harvey, supra note 6, at 476 (identifying ability to designate accounts
outside system as weakness of QI regime).
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money laundering and related criminal law concerns.24 And, finally, the
QI rules defined “beneficial owner” to include a corporation, a rule which
permitted U.S. account holders to hide their U.S. identity.25
Because the “beneficial owner” of an account was defined to include a
corporation under the QI rules, a U.S. taxpayer could form a non-U.S.
shell corporation, name the corporation as the account owner, and treat
the account as owned by a bona fide non-U.S. person. The Swiss bank
UBS, as well as, presumably, other non-U.S. banks, apparently openly advised its clients to avail themselves of this exit route.26 The U.S. government learned about these practices in part thanks to ex-UBS banker
Bradley Birkenfeld, who offered information about his former employer’s
practices including the formation of client shell corporations and the
cross-border smuggling of cash and precious gems.27
The United States criminally prosecuted UBS and reached a deferred
prosecution agreement.28 It then pursued civil litigation against UBS
which resulted in an agreement to disclose the identities of about four
thousand U.S. UBS clients to the United States.29 The path to this disclo24. See Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status, Act II:
Notice 99-8 and the Role of a Qualified Intermediary, 28 TAX MGM’T INT’L J. 259, 262
(1999) (describing typical practice of country’s bank association guiding KYC rules
to IRS approval for use in QI agreement). These rules might not look automatically through entities, for example, but restrict investigation to situations where
criminal activity seems likely.
25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(c)(3) (1997) (defining foreign corporation as
foreign beneficial owner). This rule is consistent with the principle of U.S. corporate income tax law that generally insists on the treatment of the corporation, not
its shareholders, as the taxpayer. See generally Comm’r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340
(1988); Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Domestic third-party
reporting generally does not apply to corporate recipients. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (1983) (listing corporation as exempt recipient for purposes of Section 6049 interest reporting).
26. See UBS EXEC. BD. WEALTH MGMT. & BUS. BANKING, QI SOLUTIONS FOR
SIMPLE AND GRANTOR TRUSTS “SWISS SOLUTION”—ALTERNATIVE TO BE APPLIED/
THRESHOLDS 1 (2004) (recommending that “UBS . . . establish an underlying company in the Bahamas” where U.S. client account housed in “Swiss solution” trust
exceeded certain threshold) (on file with author); UBS, QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY
SYSTEM: U.S. WITHHOLDING TAX ON DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST INCOME FROM U.S.
SECURITIES 2 (2004) (noting that non-U.S. legal entities could claim reduced withholding rates under QI system and that certification with respect to any applicable
limitation on benefits treaty article was required for reduced rates of dividend
withholding, but not for portfolio interest exemption) (on file with author).
27. See Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, Cracking the Vault, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
23, 2009, at 32 (reporting Birkenfeld’s cross-border transport of diamonds in
toothpaste tube).
28. See Spencer Daly, Note, Secrecy in Limbo: What the Most Recent Settlement with
the IRS Means for UBS and the Rest of the Swiss Banking Industry, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
133, 143–48 (2011) (tracing criminal prosecution and deferred prosecution agreement story and connecting it to treaty relationship between U.S. and Switzerland).
29. See Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. to Drop Suit Against UBS Over Tax Havens, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at B6 (reporting that 2000 names had been disclosed and
that United States expected disclosure of balance).
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sure, which presented no small tension with Swiss bank secrecy law,30 involved the announcement of an agreement following a visit to Switzerland
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,31 acquiescence by the Swiss Parliament,32 and the approval of Switzerland’s highest court.33 Meanwhile, the
United States engaged in a high-profile and fairly successful campaign34 to
persuade taxpayers to self-report their offshore accounts, which included
the use of Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBARs.35
The Obama administration then generated the idea of FATCA,36
which was initially proposed in May 200937 and passed, in modified form,
in March 2010.38 The statutory and regulatory components of FATCA meticulously avoid various deficiencies of the QI program. FATCA’s provisions allow for significant withholding penalties on a broad range of
payment streams, require that all accounts must be disclosed regardless of
whether they produce U.S.-source income, impose relatively stringent dili30. See Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States Government’s
Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy
Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3–7 (2010) (describing historic Swiss commitment to legal regime of bank secrecy).
31. See Sue Pleming & Deborah Charles, Clinton Says Agreement “in Principle”
with UBS, REUTERS (July 31, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN314232
8120090731 (reporting Hillary Clinton’s announcement of litigation settlement
agreement and her related meeting with Swiss foreign minister).
32. See Lynnley Browning & David Jolly, Swiss Approve Deal for UBS to Reveal
U.S. Clients Suspected of Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at B3 (reporting that
Swiss legislature approved deal in lieu of pursuing national referendum).
33. Originally, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court held that the failure to
file a W-9 with UBS for transmission to the U.S. tax authorities did not constitute
“tax fraud and the like” and therefore did not meet a requirement under the 1996
treaty for an exception to bank secrecy protection. See Daniel Pruzin, Switzerland
for Now to Hand Over Data on Only 250 Secret Accounts with UBS, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT WEEKLY REPORT 144–45 (Feb. 1, 2010). In July 2011, the lower court’s decision was reversed, preventing UBS account holders from claiming damages for
breach of bank secrecy from UBS. See Emma Thomasson, Swiss Court Says Was
Right to Give U.S. Bank Data, REUTERS (July 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/07/15/ubs-idUSLDE76E12W20110715 (noting court’s view that U.S.
indictment that could have resulted absent Swiss regulator’s order for handover of
information “ ‘would have led to the bankruptcy of the bank which in turn would
have caused serious and virtually uncontrollable economic repercussions for Switzerland . . . .’ ” (quoting Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland)).
34. See Morse, supra note 10, at 710–18 (arguing that creative publicity and
expectation-setting for appropriate penalties helped make offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives successful).
35. See Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts, 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2010);
TREASURY DEP’T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 90-22.1.
36. See Harvey, supra note 6, at 479–81 (relating initial concept of FATCA as
expansion of QI system).
37. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 43, 45 (2009).
38. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147,
§ 501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
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gence requirements, and use an expanded beneficial owner concept.39
These provisions are remarkable innovations, and push existing law and
practice in several ways.
First, FATCA broadens the scope of covered payments subject to its
30% withholding tax to include virtually all returns from financial investment accounts, and notably includes the sledgehammer of withholding on
gross proceeds from the sale of securities.40 This is not consistent with the
idea that the application of an income tax to sale proceeds should be limited to gain on sale, or the difference between the gross proceeds realized
from the sale and the basis of the securities sold.41 One commentator has
characterized FATCA as a penalty statute rather than an enforcement statute because it is not designed to reach taxable income.42
Second, FATCA’s requirement for disclosure of accounts regardless of
whether they generate U.S. source income or are held at an affiliate of a
participating FFI broadens the existing idea that source withholding may
be used to enforce taxes due to a source government by reason of its
source jurisdiction. The source withholding idea is a cornerstone of the
existing international tax system43 and lies at the heart of the QI regime.44
Under FATCA, the idea morphs, and the threat of source withholding on
one set of accounts (those that hold securities that generate U.S.-source
investment income) is used to prompt and enforce disclosure of another
set of accounts (those owned by U.S. taxpayers). The first and second
group of accounts may overlap only partially, or even not at all.
Third, FATCA refuses to allow FFIs to rely on documentation provided to them that asserts clients’ residence or tax status, but instead spe39. In addition to the provisions discussed in the text, FATCA also features an
innovative requirement to withhold on broadly defined “payments” received from
other institutions and “attributable to withholdable payments.” See I.R.C.
§ 1471(b)(1)(D)(i), (d)(7) (2006); Harvey, supra note 6 (describing pass-thru payment rule and recommending that government delay its implementation).
FATCA addresses the possibility that participating FFIs will assign U.S. accounts to
related banks outside the scope of the FFI agreement by requiring all affiliates to
be party to the FFI agreement. See I.R.C. § 1471(e) (applying requirements of
FATCA to all members of FFI’s “expanded affiliated group”). FATCA guidance
also indicates continued creative attention to problems like default rules for accounts as to which no information is provided. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2011–34,
2011-19 I.R.B. 765, 769 (noting that Treasury may terminate FFI Agreements due
to number of recalcitrant account holders after certain amount of time).
40. See I.R.C. § 1471(a) (imposing 30% tax); § 1473(1) (defining withholdable payment and including gross proceeds).
41. See I.R.C. § 1001 (providing for taxation of gain on sale of assets).
42. See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act:
Boldly Going Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2985
(2011) (noting FATCA’s apparent penalty purpose).
43. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of
U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1036–38 (1997) (explaining importance of source jurisdiction protection in development of international tax
system).
44. See Morse & Shay, supra note 20, at 333–34.
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cifically requires extra diligence if certain indicia of de facto U.S.
ownership exist in the materials provided in connection with the account.45 This departs from, or at least changes the interpretation of, the
usual principle that withholding agents46 and tax preparers47 may rely on
representations provided to them by the taxpayer absent an obvious reason to believe that such representations are incorrect.
Fourth, FATCA refuses to presume that a corporation is a taxpayer
and beneficial owner. It requires reporting, for example, of accounts held
by a foreign entity if more than ten percent of the equity in that entity is
held by a U.S. person.48 This is consistent with the approach of the FBAR
reporting rules, which require reporting for accounts over which a U.S.
person has signatory authority, but it departs from the longstanding principle of U.S. federal income tax law that respects corporations as
taxpayers.49
FATCA’s status as a unilateral piece of legislation facilitated its innovations. U.S. policymakers immersed in the UBS case and responding to the
revealed deficiencies of the QI regime crafted an audacious statute that
goes right to the doors of FFIs to demand needed information.50 The
United States’ decision to move the legislation without seeking consensus
45. For example, under proposed regulations, a U.S. address or telephone
number or U.S. place of birth constitutes “reason to know” that non-U.S. documentation is inaccurate. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-3(e)(4), 77 Fed. Reg. 9022,
9027 (Feb. 15, 2012) (providing reason to know guidelines for U.S. withholding
agents); id. § 1.1471-4(c)(4) (providing due diligence requirements for FFIs and
adding other U.S. indicia). Diligence requirements are more stringent for larger
accounts, see, e.g., id. and for later-opened accounts. See, e.g., id. § 1.1471-3(c)(8)
(requiring additional diligence for accounts over $1 million); id. § 1.14714(c)(4)(ii) and (iii) (providing relief for certain pre-existing accounts at FFIs).
The intergovernmental framework adopted by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
United States, and the UK anticipates negotiation over due diligence requirements. See FATCA 2012 FRAMEWORK JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 12, at 3 (anticipating the “development of reporting and due diligence standards”).
46. See, e.g., Int’l Lotto Fund v. Va. State Lottery Dep’t, 800 F. Supp. 337, 342
(E.D. Va. 1992) (“The role of a withholding agent is ministerial in nature. The
agent is not granted the discretion by the I.R.S. to conduct an audit-like inquiry
upon submission of a properly completed Form 1001.” (citation omitted)), rev’d,
20 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1994).
47. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2000) (providing that no tax preparer penalty is
due if “there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the [preparer] acted
in good faith”); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(e)(4) (2008) (describing “good faith” standard to include consideration of actual knowledge of preparer and whether
preparer’s normal procedures promote accuracy and include “methods for obtaining necessary information from the taxpayer”).
48. See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(1)(A) (defining “United States account” as “account
which is held by one or more specified United States persons or United States
owned foreign entities”); id. § 1471(d)(3) (defining “United States owned foreign
entity” as entity with “substantial United States owners”); id. § 1473(2) (defining
“substantial United States owner” as more than ten percent owner).
49. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (reviewing authorities regarding
independent corporate taxpayer status).
50. See Harvey, supra note 6, at 479–82 (describing genesis of FATCA).
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from banking jurisdictions sped up the process of enacting FATCA. And if
FATCA’s streamlined information reporting channel does not involve
non-U.S. governments, such governments should not be able to hold the
system hostage, whether through intentional lack of cooperation or understandable logistical challenges.
But the United States almost certainly cannot enforce FATCA all by
itself. First, imposing a withholding tax could produce unwanted capital
market disruptions and require the commitment of international relations
resources.51 Second, local legal barriers including bank secrecy law limit
banks’ ability to disclose information about their account holders.52
Third, the United States lacks the jurisdiction to confirm directly that FFIs
are in fact complying with their obligations under their agreements.
The statute contemplates FFIs’ agreement to regular audits, and the
model FFI agreement will likely require FFIs to use a certified firm, such as
one of the Big 4 firms or one of their affiliates, to conduct the audit.53
These audit requirements push the responsibility for ensuring that
FATCA’s requirements are met onto the local divisions or affiliates of audit firms, over which the United States also generally does not exercise
jurisdiction, making direct enforcement impractical. The potential of the
audit firm gatekeeper enforcement strategy for FATCA is limited by the
extent to which audit firms perceive that compliance will attract reputational benefits (or noncompliance will produce reputational detriments)
and by such firms’ capacity to execute their responsibility within the limits
of local confidentiality requirements.
It is possible that FATCA may succeed under an expressive law and
reputational signaling strategy. As I have written elsewhere, non-U.S. FFIs
might embrace compliance with FATCA as a positive reputational signal to
clients and governments.54 This signal might grow in strength as more
banks comply with FATCA and as compliant banks increasingly commit to
FATCA compliance through their very acts of due diligence and reporting.
There are certain choices that U.S. policymakers can make to maximize
the chance that FATCA will succeed as a reputational strategy. For example, policymakers can consider strategies that reference reputation, have
high salience, target management, and embrace incrementalism to foster
51. See Morse, supra note 10, at 725–26 (outlining capital markets and international relations obstacles to imposition of FATCA’s withholding tax). U.S. government representatives have said that they want “transparency,” not withholding, to
result from FATCA. See, e.g., Tom Braithwaite, U.S. Delays Reporting Rules for Foreign
Banks, FIN. TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe2f7bae-ae49-11
e0-844e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nQH7aEb7 (quoting IRS Commissioner Doug
Shulman).
52. See Scratched by the FATCA, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2011, at 86 (noting conflict
between FATCA and other nations’ “data-protection laws”).
53. The QI agreement also takes this approach. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000
C.B. 387 § 10.
54. See Morse, supra note 10, at 729 (proposing reputation-signaling FATCA
administration strategy targeting FFIs).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

R

R

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR306.txt

538

unknown

Seq: 10

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

30-NOV-12

10:36

[Vol. 57: p. 529

the development of a virtuous norm-development cycle.55 But the success
of this approach is far from certain. Except to the extent that a reputational strategy works, the United States will require the cooperation of
other governments to enforce FATCA.
B.

The European Approach: Bank-to-Bank
Government-to-Residence Government

The European approach to the problem of offshore accounts has
taken a more multilateral tone compared to FATCA. Its centerpiece, the
EUSD, applies to more than forty countries when combined with closely
related and parallel agreements. These countries include twenty-seven EU
member states, plus ten territories associated with EU member states and
five other European states, including Liechtenstein and Switzerland.56
The core of the EUSD is its requirement that the competent authority, or
national tax administration, of a jurisdiction must forward information
about the interest income flows paid by banks located in that jurisdiction
to the residence jurisdictions of the owners of the interest income.57
The “years of fierce debate” that preceded the adoption of the EUSD
in June 2003 featured objections from EU members Austria, Belgium, and
Luxembourg that they would not agree to the reporting requirement unless their banking industry competitor Switzerland—not an EU member—
did the same.58 The EU negotiators resolved the debate by permitting
countries to opt to impose a withholding tax on interest income, now set
at thirty-five percent, in lieu of reporting.59 Relatively few countries permit withholding rather than reporting.60 When a country withholds, it
keeps twenty-five percent of the withholding proceeds and pays over seventy-five percent to the beneficial owner’s residence jurisdiction.61
The weaknesses of the EUSD parallel some of the weaknesses of the
roughly contemporaneous QI system, although the EUSD squarely aimed
to address underreporting by domestic resident taxpayers while the QI system focused on taxpayers not resident in the United States. First, the
55. See id. at 728; cf. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 593 (1998) (describing possibility of several compliance equilibria).
56. See EU Taxation of Savings: Rules Applicable, supra note 9 (describing scope
of ESD).
57. See Council Directive 2003/48, supra note 8, at art. 9 (providing for exchange of information between competent authorities).
58. See John C. Brouwer & Godfried J.W. Kinnegim, What the EU Savings Directive Means, 14 INT’L TAX REV. 10, 10 (2003) (recounting history of debate).
59. See id. (describing compromise).
60. These include EU member states Austria and Luxembourg and five banking jurisdictions with parallel withholding agreements: Andorra, Liechtenstein,
San Marino, Monaco, and Switzerland. Belgium now reports rather than withholding. See EU Taxation of Savings: Rules Applicable, supra note 9 (listing countries that
withhold).
61. See Council Directive 2003/48, supra note 8, at art. 12 (providing for revenue sharing).
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EUSD requires withholding only on “interest payments,” rather than
reaching all types of income from financial investments.62 In addition,
the EUSD permits reliance on the same kinds of documentation
presented for purposes of know-your-customer anti-money-laundering
laws.63 Finally, the EUSD, like the QI system, permits payers to recognize
“legal persons” such as corporations as beneficial account holders.64 Thus
the shell corporation workaround also avoids EUSD reporting and withholding obligations.65
While Bradley Birkenfeld’s disclosures about UBS revealed the QI system’s deficiencies and prompted litigation against UBS in the United
States, contemporaneous European events similarly disclosed the inadequacy of the EUSD. The EUSD simply did not ensure the taxation of European residents by their home countries, even when those residents held
their interest-producing assets in banks subject to the disclosure or withholding requirements of the EUSD. In the most prominent example, Germany in 2008 launched a major investigation regarding up to four billion
euros in funds held by German citizens in Liechtenstein banks. The investigation targeted a large number of prominent German taxpayers, many of
whom held assets through shell entities.66
European residence jurisdictions responded to the shortcomings of
the EUSD in several ways. First, they stepped up audit activity, in one instance purchasing confidential bank data to assist the effort.67 Second,
several residence jurisdictions struck bilateral deals with bank secrecy jurisdictions inspired by the withholding option offered by the EUSD.68
62. See id. at art. 6 (defining interest payment). It is possible that nearly all
offshore accounts pay some kind of bank deposit interest, so that the ESD could
operate as a comprehensive requirement to disclose offshore accounts if the withholding option did not apply. But the narrowness of the definition raises a close
substitutes problem. In other words, banks might substitute another form of investment income or fee relief for bank deposit interest if only bank deposit income
is subject to reporting. Cf. Morse, supra note 10, at 691–92 (describing close substitutes problem in general terms).
63. See Council Directive 2003/48, supra note 8, at art. 3(2)(b) (permitting
reliance on passport or personal identification card).
64. See id. at art. 4(2) (providing that paying agents need not look through
“legal persons”).
65. See, e.g., Vanessa Houlder, When There Are Fewer Places to Hide Funny Money,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/99eb9e7c-2247-11dbbc00-0000779e2340.html#axzz25iu2Y6NG (reporting relatively small withholding
tax collections under ESD and “[l]oopholes[ ] such as the exemption of trusts and
companies”).
66. See Not So Fine in Liechtenstein, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.
economist.com/node/10750259 (describing German investigation and tension between Liechtenstein bank secrecy and “convoluted” German tax laws).
67. See id. (noting increased audit activity and recounting purchase of confidential bank data); see also Not-So-Safe Havens, ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2009), http://
www.economist.com/node/13148143 (noting “intense pressure from Germany,
France, Britain and a few others” on tax havens).
68. Germany and the UK have both struck agreements with Switzerland that
provide for withholding and preserve secrecy. See Grinberg, supra note 3 (manu-
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Under these agreements, banking jurisdictions would “in effect pay a fat
fee” to residence jurisdictions, said to be equal to the withholding tax due
on noncompliant accounts, “to avoid revealing clients’ names.”69 When
clients’ names are kept secret, the residence government cannot further
investigate their tax compliance, for example with respect to taxes due on
account principal or on non-interest investment income.70
In 2008, the EU developed a proposal, still pending, to tighten the
EUSD’s provisions.71 The EU’s proposal falls short of the U.S. FATCA
provisions in several respects. It expands the scope of the EUSD to returns
on certain financial instruments that economically substitute for interest
payments, but it does not attempt to reach other investment returns, including gross proceeds.72 It does not impose expanded, tax-evasion-tailored diligence requirements based on indicia of connections with taxing
jurisdictions. It provides that the owners of corporations may be treated as
the beneficial owners of accounts nominally held by corporations, but
these rules are limited by existing anti-money-laundering rules and diligence procedures.73 Finally, November 2012 marks the fourth anniversary
of the proposal’s publication, and it has not become law.
In February 2011, a EU Directive regarding cooperation on direct taxation matters included the requirement that one member state automatically transfer to another member state information available to the tax
script at 8) (describing and criticizing agreements); Haig Simonian, Confidentiality:
Switzerland Moves to Avert Threat to Privacy Privileges, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8b2a76b0-0f68-11e1-88cc-00144feabdc0.html#a
xzz25iu2Y6NG (reporting German-Swiss and UK-Swiss agreements and interest in
similar agreements in France, Greece, and Italy). These agreements follow the
preferred Swiss withhold-but-don’t-disclose “Rubik” model. Compare TAX JUSTICE
NETWORK, THE UK-SWISS TAX AGREEMENT: DOOMED TO FAIL 3 (2011), available at
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TJN_1110_UK-Swiss_master.pdf (reporting Swiss-German and Swiss-UK deals and negotiations to extend model to
other countries and criticizing Rubik approach), with Niels Jense, Note, How to Kill
the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1823, 1852–58 (2010) (describing Swiss-proposed solution as “a
good starting point”).
69. Tax Havens: Trouble Island, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21532264; see also Vanessa Houlder, Britons to Be Taxed on Secret
Billions, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b4f2fb2-74
da-11e0-a4b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25iu2Y6NG (detailing agreements).
70. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 3 (manuscript at 54); Simonian, supra note
68 (reporting that participants at G20 meetings “hint[ed] [that] Switzerland
should do more”).
71. See Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation
of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, COM (2008) 727 final (Nov. 13,
2008).
72. See id. at 19 (recommending amendments to Article 6).
73. See id. at 14–15 (proposing amendment to Article 2). The explanation
states that the intent of the proposal is to apply anti-money laundering lookthrough principles to the beneficial owner definition and the proposal lists types
of entities that paying agents must look through. See id. at 3–4, 28–40 (discussing
proposed amendments).
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authorities of the first state.74 The Directive includes member state reporting requirements, for example applicable to information-sharing statistics, and anticipates a 2017 proposal “regarding the categories of
income and capital and/or the conditions [of reporting], including the
condition that information concerning residents in other Member States
has to be available.”75 Like FATCA, this 2011 EU Directive is moving in
the direction of automatic global information reporting,76 but it has made
less progress than FATCA in setting forth the mechanics of how to achieve
that goal and erecting an enforcement structure around it.
A system that permits withholding instead of reporting is generally
less satisfactory to a taxing authority. There are at least two reasons for
this. First, reporting, like withholding, should produce very high rates of
compliance.77 Second, a tax authority may use reported information
about the individual taxpayer to determine whether that taxpayer has fully
complied with the law. Suppose, for example, there was a strong statistical
correlation between taxpayers who had large offshore bank accounts and
taxpayers who failed to pay tax on amounts they deposited in such accounts. Or, suppose that many offshore account holders reported some,
but not all, of their offshore income. A system that provides the residence
government with the identity of the offshore account holders allows that
information to improve audit selection and increase the chance of successful audit.78
Though the EU approach lacks the boldness of FATCA, it has greater
potential for good enforcement. This is so simply because the EU approach involves the banking jurisdiction governments, which have the
power to enforce its provisions, so far as these provisions go. From the
perspective of a tax administrator, the disadvantages of Switzerland’s decision to strike withholding tax deals on behalf of its banks include greater
support for the goal of bank secrecy and the logistically difficult involvement of another party in the tedious project of crafting a working system.
But a significant advantage is that the Swiss tax authority joins the project
74. See Council Directive 2011/16/EU, Administrative Cooperation in the
Field of Taxation and Repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, 2011 O.J. (L 64) 1 (EU).
75. See id. at art 8.
76. See Grinberg, supra note 3 (manuscript at 34–35) (noting that this directive could lead to proposal including reporting of capital gains, dividends and royalties that would be generally consistent with FATCA).
77. Reporting is generally sufficient to assure very high compliance. See
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 5, at 179 (reporting very high rates of compliance
when income is reported but not withheld upon).
78. Itai Grinberg has raised the question of whether developing countries, as
well as developed countries, would prefer an automatic information reporting system to an anonymous withholding system. An automatic information reporting
system permits a residence jurisdiction more control over its public finance system.
See Grinberg, supra note 3 (manuscript at 65–70). An anonymous withholding system produces tax revenue without reliance on domestic audit and collection functions. Different residence jurisdictions may weigh these opposing benefits
differently.
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of achieving the tax collection goal. Also, the Swiss agreement to participate might provide a stronger starting point for reconciling a reporting
law with Swiss confidentiality requirements.
FATCA features innovative provisions that adopt broad definitions of
reportable payments, beneficial ownership, and diligence requirements.79
It may well represent best practices for many elements of a global information reporting system. But the lack of any involvement by non-U.S. governments in FATCA’s B2G reporting infrastructure makes FATCA
enforcement unrealistic. U.S. tax administrators can improve the chances
of FATCA’s success by seeking the cooperation and involvement of nonU.S. governments. Part III outlines three possible tactics: simplicity, reciprocity, and side payments.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

FOR

U.S. POLICYMAKERS

Possible Forms of Non-U.S. Government Cooperation

The cooperation of non-U.S. governments with the endeavor of
FATCA could come in several different forms. Cooperation could follow
the mainstream EUSD B2G2G reporting model and transfer the obligation to report beneficial owner income streams from FFIs to the tax authorities of the jurisdictions where such FFIs operate. The Model
Agreements developed by the U.S. in accordance with a multilateral
framework follow this approach.80 Cooperation could also involve nonU.S. governments less formally in developing an approach to reconciling
FATCA with other countries’ bank secrecy laws.81 For example, it could
feature an agreement by a non-U.S. government to include a FATCA compliance checklist for examinations or reports required under domestic
law, such as for securities, banking law, or third-party auditor licensing
purposes.82 A non-U.S. government might permit U.S. government representatives access to FFIs for direct audit purposes. Or cooperation could
79. For a further discussion of FATCA, see supra notes 36–49 and accompanying text (describing FATCA’s provisions).
80. See FATCA 2012 FRAMEWORK JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 12 (noting parties United States, France, Germany, Italy and UK).
81. One appropriate goal would be state-of-the-art data encryption and other
system design features in order to prevent the leakage of customer information
outside government computer systems, rather than an agreement to withhold and
maintain bank secrecy based on the Swiss Rubik model.
82. Options that would involve non-U.S. governments’ involvement in the enforcement of U.S. law assume that historic revenue rule constraints could be overcome. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161,
170–77, 202–06 (2002) (giving history of “revenue rule” refusal to enforce other
countries’ tax laws and absence of mutual collection assistance provisions from tax
treaties). The ESD, treaty-based information exchange, and other developments,
including U.S. case law developments, suggest that the revenue rule would not
preclude this type of intergovernmental cooperation. See, e.g., Pasquantino v.
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 356, 364 (2005) (holding in five to four decision that
scheme to evade Canadian excise taxes qualified as fraud under U.S. law and
hence could support wire fraud conviction).
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consist of the non-U.S. governments’ adoption of diligence provisions,83
reporting provisions,84 or both that are similar to or borrowed from
FATCA—thus aligning non-U.S. governments’ interests with U.S. interests
without any explicit involvement of non-U.S. governments in U.S. enforcement of the FATCA rules.
In anticipating the development of a cooperative, intergovernmental
system of automatic tax information reporting, policymakers must make
regular choices between, on the one hand, accepting incremental agreements and anticipating further development of cooperation based on
these incremental changes, and, on the other hand, striving to get things
right the first time. Recent history in this area suggests the value of incremental change. The existence of QI laid the groundwork for FATCA
within the U.S. political environment. The OECD’s tepid Tax Information Exchange Agreement program provides a building block upon which
automatic information exchange may partly rest.85 The EU’s 2011 Directive shows evidence of halting progress from on-demand, to spontaneous,
to automatic information sharing.
As Itai Grinberg has written, one model for incremental change is a
“bifurcated” system. This approach would establish a compliance model
for cooperative nations and a noncompliance model for uncooperative
nations. A noncompliant nation’s banks would be subject to harsher
rules, such as more onerous diligence and a real threat of punitive
withholding.86
A bifurcated approach presents the risk that significant numbers of
countries and non-U.S. banks will refuse to move into the compliance
group on the terms offered. The nations negotiating intergovernmental
FATCA agreements are generally developed nations with strong interests
in collecting information about their residents’ offshore income.87 Other
nations have different interests. For example, their interest in maintaining bank secrecy laws could be greater relative to their interest in collecting information on their residents’ offshore income.
In a one-jurisdiction context, the idea of forcing a choice between two
menu options draws support from the fact that taxpayers must deal with

83. See Harvey, supra note 6, at 495 (“If several major countries agreed on
customer due diligence procedures, . . . it could significantly strengthen the IRS’s
hand when attempting to force a FFI to perform detailed due diligence procedures on its entire customer base . . . .”).
84. See id. (outlining multilateral FATCA system where each FFI would report
to more than one residence country).
85. See Morse, supra note 10, at 702–07 (framing OECD harmful tax competition project as incremental expressive law effort).
86. See Grinberg, supra note 3 (manuscript at 86).
87. See, e.g., FATCA 2012 FRAMEWORK JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 12 (naming United States, France, Germany, Italy, and UK as parties).
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the tax administration of the jurisdiction on some terms.88 In a multijurisdictional context, it may not work to force a choice between two menu
options presented by a subset of the relevant jurisdictions because taxpayers might opt out of the menu altogether. U.S. taxpayers in the offshore
account could opt out by seeking out banks that did not invest in U.S.
securities. In addition, U.S. taxpayers might reasonably decide to try to
call Uncle Sam’s bluff, gambling that the United States is really not prepared to impose punitive withholding on U.S. source income streams going to, say, Hong Kong or Singapore.
The balance of this Part III presents the cooperation strategies of simplicity, reciprocity, and side payments. In part, the discussion frames the
course of ongoing negotiations over intergovernmental FATCA agreements based on the multilateral FATCA framework and the models
presented by the United States. In addition, it provides a toolbox that
could establish different cooperative objectives to further the goal of persuading as many nations as possible to join the project of automatic information reporting.
The strategies described here could accommodate an incremental
pattern of reform in which initial compromises help to build commitment
to the program of global reporting, which could later support modifications that expand reporting requirements, tighten diligence obligations or
otherwise strengthen the program.89 The strategies could also accommodate a pattern of global information reporting development that varied
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
B.

Simplicity

The promise of FATCA lies in the possibility that it will become a
model for an automatic global income tax information reporting system
that effectively delivers bona fide beneficial owner information. The quality of FATCA reporting is important. Increasing the range of payments
and accounts subject to reporting, expanding due diligence requirements,
tailoring due diligence to the requirements of tax law rather than piggybacking on money laundering law’s risk assessment approach, looking
through shell corporations, and other FATCA innovations increase the
chance of producing high-quality beneficial owner reporting.
Yet greater simplicity would also benefit FATCA’s implementation.
Effective non-U.S. government involvement in the implementation of
FATCA—whether directly as part of the reporting stream, indirectly as enforcers of FFI compliance or FFI auditor compliance, or in parallel as
users of the same rules for their own domestic tax enforcement pur88. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 710–14 (2009) (describing information-forcing mechanisms in context of tax compliance and enforcement).
89. See Morse, supra note 10, at 731–35 (advocating incrementalism due to its
norm-building potential but noting countervailing factors including possible close
substitutes, uncertainty, and public choice).
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poses—will be easier if FATCA’s requirements are simpler.90 Also essential is the delivery of the required information in an electronic form
compatible with different countries’ and companies’ database and
software systems.91
One way to simplify the administration of FATCA is to provide exemptions to types of financial products and institutions that do not present a
high risk of harboring tax-evading U.S. account holders. Some commentators describe this as “the primary area for negotiation” in the model intergovernmental FATCA agreements.92 Annex II of the agreement
between the U.S. and the UK exempts products like certain retirement
funds, and institutions including the Bank of England and some financial
institutions with a local client base and no non-UK fixed place of business,
from FATCA requirements.93
As another example, FATCA implementation could take at least three
approaches when describing required FATCA reporting. The first, minimal approach would restrict FATCA reporting to seven fields: (1) taxpayer
name; (2) taxpayer address; (3) taxpayer identification number; (4) bank
name; (5) bank identification number; (6) taxpayer account number; and
(7) account value, for example the maximum during the reporting year.
This is consistent with the statute, which conditions more detailed reporting requirements on the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury.94
This first approach achieves the delivery of the most important piece
of information: that a domestic taxpayer holds an offshore account of a
certain size. The taxpayer’s awareness of the government’s knowledge of
the offshore account serves a useful function even absent specific income
flow information. Relevant empirical and experimental research demonstrates that perceived opportunity to evade drives decisions to not report
income from certain sources. A taxpayer need not believe that the government knows the precise amount of income flows in order to believe that
there is a significant chance of getting caught because the government
knows that the account exists.95
90. Cf. David Jolly, For Americans Abroad, Taxes Just Got More Complicated, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/global/
for-americans-abroad-taxes-just-got-more-complicated.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2,
(quoting practitioners as describing unfortunately complicated “shadow FBAR”
form required to be filed by taxpayers including American expatriates as “monstrosity” that would “take a full Saturday to [complete]”).
91. See, e.g., OECD 2009 TRACE REPORT, supra note 11, at 32 (“[E]lectronic
submission of documents is not a sufficient answer to the question of how to create
an efficient system for making and granting claims for treaty benefits.”).
92. Sapirie & Parillo, supra note 14, at 1497.
93. See U.S.-UK FATCA Agreement, supra note 14, at Annex II.
94. See I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)(D)(2010) (giving Secretary of Treasury discretion
to decide whether to require reporting of receipts and withdrawals).
95. For example, studies have demonstrated that tax compliance is higher for
income received in the form of a check than for cash income. See Maryann Richardson & Adrian J. Sawyer, A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature: Further Findings, Problems and Prospects, 16 AUSTL. TAX FORUM 137, 171 (2001) (citing studies);
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Second, the U.S. government could require reporting of income
streams as defined under local law. This is the approach taken in the proposed regulations, which also give FFIs some ability to report in local currency rather than U.S. dollars.96 It may be that reporting of income
streams as determined under local law does not add additional complexity
to the reporting project, but that application of U.S. law, the currency
conversion, or both would be particularly burdensome. If so, this compromise struck in the regulations is appropriate within the context of the goal
of reaching cooperative solutions.
Finally, FATCA guidance could require reporting of income streams
as defined under U.S. law, in U.S. currency. This would make automatic
matching to tax return information easier.97 But the compliance advantage, as the regulations appear to acknowledge, is likely not worth the
trouble of implementing the approach within the non-U.S. banks on
whom the success of FATCA rests.
The 2012 FATCA framework also anticipates negotiation over reporting and diligence requirements. Perhaps there is a chance that this process could produce a simple, salient electronic reporting methodology.
That should be an important and stated goal.
C.

Reciprocity

One challenge facing a U.S. attempt to persuade non-U.S. countries
to cooperate with its FATCA project of offshore information reporting is
that the United States does not readily share account holder information
with other countries. Different obstacles to information sharing appear in
the cases of payments of U.S. source income to non-U.S. beneficial owners
depending on whether the beneficial owners hold accounts at non-U.S.
institutions or U.S. institutions. Despite these challenges, the multilateral
2012 FATCA framework98 and the finalized U.S.-UK agreement both feature reciprocity.99
In the case of accounts maintained at non-U.S. institutions, it may be
that no institution under U.S. jurisdiction has the necessary customer insee also James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J.
ECON. LIT. 818, 841–43 (1998) (explaining income source compliance factor).
96. See Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.1471-4(d)(4)(iv), 77 Fed. Reg. 9046 (Feb. 15,
2012) (requiring reporting of dividends, interest, gross proceeds, and other income as determined under local law).
97. Precise income flows can facilitate the automatic matching of specific
items of income to specific lines on a taxpayer’s tax form. But different definitions
of, for example, interest and dividends in different countries would make matching more difficult. Cf. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Treasury Expects Billions
from Credit Card Reporting Proposal, 115 TAX NOTES 890, 891 (2007) (noting that
automatic item matching requires separate listing on third party tax reports).
98. See FATCA 2012 FRAMEWORK JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 12.
99. See U.S.-UK FATCA Agreement, supra note 14, at Article 2.2.b (describing
U.S. undertaking to report interest income and U.S.-source dividend and certain
other income paid to UK reportable accounts).
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formation. In particular, the QI program shields non-U.S. accountholder
information from disclosure to any U.S. party, including both U.S. intermediaries and the U.S. government.100 Consequently, at least with respect to payments routed through QIs, the United States is left without the
information needed to assist a non-U.S. government with the non-U.S.
government’s project of combating tax evasion engaged in by its residents
with respect to investment returns paid from U.S. sources into non-U.S.
accounts.
In the case of accounts maintained at U.S. institutions, the example of
Canada illustrates the possibility of automatic information sharing with another government. The United States-Canada tax treaty includes Article
26A, an addition to the usual U.S. model treaty form, which provides that
“[t]he Contracting States undertake to lend assistance to each other in the
collection of taxes.”101 A Treasury Regulation implements this treaty article by providing for automatic reporting of bank deposit interest “with
respect to a deposit maintained [by a Canadian treaty resident] at an office within the United States.”102 Mexico has specifically requested similar
reporting,103 and a U.S. regulation finalized in 2012 would require this
sort of bank deposit reporting to all other countries’ residents.104
Opponents of reciprocal measures like the nonresident bank deposit
reporting regulation warn of reduced inbound deposits from nonresidents, decreased lending capabilities, and regional economic contraction.105 But the Treasury has stood its ground. For example, in a series of
100. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000 C.B. 387, at § 6.01 (“QI is not required to
disclose . . . any information regarding the identity of an account holder that is a
foreign person . . . .”).
101. Income Tax Convention, U.S.–Can., art. 26A, Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No.
1187. A 1995 Protocol added the collection assistance article. See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States and Canada with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital, S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-9, art. 15 (1995).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-8(a) (1996).
103. See Kevin Preslan, Note, Turnabout is Fair Play: The U.S. Response to Mexico’s
Request for Bank Account Information, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 203, 224–26 (2011)
(considering different ways to comply with Mexico’s request for automatic information exchange).
104. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-8; Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 77 Fed. Reg. 23391 (Apr. 19, 2012) (changing reporting requirements). However, opposition in Congress has produced a bill that would delay the
regulations’ effective date. See Lee A. Sheppard, FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 1083 (Sept. 17. 2012) (reporting on legislation that
passed the House). The regulation lacks FATCA’s careful investigation of accounts’ ultimate beneficial ownership, as it simply requires the reporting of “interest paid to any nonresident alien individual.” See Treas. Reg. 1.6049-8(a). Some
had proposed amending the regulations to include more stringent beneficial
owner rules. See, e.g., Letter from Carl Levin, U.S. Senator, to Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Comm’r (Apr. 18, 2011), available at 2011 WTD 74-33 (LEXIS) (recommending identification of “beneficial owners behind shell entities”).
105. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Bank Interest Reporting, Finally, Maybe (Aug. 31,
2011), available at 2011 WTD 173-2 (LEXIS) (detailing objections to proposed regulation based on capital flight and other arguments and government’s “stern and
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similar letters written to legislators concerned about reductions in inbound bank deposits, officials explained that reciprocity is key to the success of the government’s campaign against offshore tax evasion and that,
after all, “the additional reporting requirements should affect only nonresidents who are not properly reporting interest income themselves in compliance with their home country’s laws.”106
Capital flight concerns arise if account holders have the opportunity
to shift funds to banks in other countries with not only bank secrecy, but
also strong property right protections and stable governments, so that
nonresidents are willing to bank there. Investment in U.S. banks may be
sticky enough that capital flight is simply not a significant concern.107 But
if policymakers were worried, they might consider coordination mechanisms to address this concern. For example, they might tie the effective
date for U.S. bank deposit reporting to the effective date for FATCA adoption by a certain percentage of FFIs or a certain percentage of non-U.S.
jurisdictions. Or they might make such reporting a part of ordinary
course treaty negotiations. The negotiation of intergovernmental FATCA
agreements provides another avenue to reciprocal information reporting.
D.

Side Payments

Side payments are an important potential tool that might be used to
induce non-U.S. governments to cooperate in the enforcement of
FATCA.108 The EUSD withholding option, which features 75/25 revenue
sharing between the residence jurisdiction and the paying agent’s jurisdiction,109 provides one example of a side payment that is closely related to
the architecture of the tax itself.
Different forms of side payments have different advantages and disadvantages. A side payment that fully compensates withholding or reporting
detailed” responses); Letter from J. Thomas Cardwell, Fla. Office of Fin. Regulation, to Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 31, 2011), available at 2011 WTD 72-33
(LEXIS) (warning of dire consequences of imposition of bank reporting rule including reduced lending capacity and economic contraction in Florida); see also
Letter from Rep. Bill Posey et al., U.S. Congressmen, to Barack Obama, U.S. President (Mar. 2, 2011) available at 2011 WTD 46-26 (LEXIS) (citing 2004 study finding that weaker version of similar regulation would cause $88 billion in capital
flight).
106. Letter from Emily McMahon, Acting Treasury Assistant Sec’y for Tax
Pol’y, to Charles W. Boustany, Jr., U.S. Congressman (Dec. 2, 2011), available at
2011 TNT 237-18 (LEXIS).
107. See Sheppard, supra note 105 (noting government position that “Treasury did not believe predictions of massive capital flight”).
108. See Timothy V. Addison, Note, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 723–25 (2009) (recommending side payment to
tax havens to align tax compliance incentives); Marshall J. Langer, The Case for
Limited Revenue-Sharing Tax Arrangements, 55 TAX NOTES INT’L 641 (Nov. 14, 2005)
(exploring revenue sharing options).
109. For a further discussion of the EUSD withholding option, see supra notes
59–61 and accompanying text.
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agents for their costs may over-incentivize investment in withholding or
reporting systems.110 A nonrefundable side payment that is unrelated to
the project of withholding fails to properly motivate the parties responsible for building the system.111 Especially if there is no withholding tax, a
side payment that shares revenue resulting from the cooperation of a particular government will face various accounting challenges including the
identification of a baseline and the separation of increased revenue
amounts resulting from the efforts of different governments.
Steven Dean has proposed one solution that strikes a promising balance between the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of side
payments. Under Dean’s proposal, a residence jurisdiction (like the
United States) would loan a banking jurisdiction (like Switzerland) the
funds necessary to construct a withholding and reporting system. Then,
the paying jurisdiction would keep a certain percentage of amounts withheld, presumably repaying the loan out of these amounts.112
Dean’s loan model might be amended to accommodate different features of a system. For example, in a system that required reporting rather
than withholding, the residence jurisdiction might forgive the loan based
on a percentage of the amounts reported. More liability for possible failure of the withholding or reporting system could be assigned to the nonU.S. banks or governments by loaning less than the full cost of building
the system.113 Loans from a consortium of residence jurisdictions could
fund the initial construction of a system. Payment of maintenance and
update costs could depend on audit access.
IV. CONCLUSION
The emerging U.S. FATCA system provides an innovative model for
the future of offshore information reporting. But its bank-to-residence
government, or B2G, model lacks a good enforcement mechanism, because the United States lacks jurisdiction over the non-U.S. banks and
other foreign financial institutions targeted by the FATCA rules. In contrast, European nations’ approach to the problem of offshore information
reporting takes a bank-to-bank governing jurisdiction-to-residence govern110. In other words, the risk of loss from imprudently overinvesting in a system is fully insured so that the regulatee has little incentive to avoid such a loss. Cf.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 109-10 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining
moral hazard using classic insurance example).
111. That is, it fails to assign liability to the parties, whether governments or
banks, responsible for creating the withholding and reporting system. Cf. id. at
105–08 (explaining value of assigning liability to “cheapest insurer” among contracting parties).
112. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
911, 957–60 (2007) (explaining “tax flight treaty” idea).
113. Cf. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 61
(4th ed. 2011) (noting deductible and co-insurance approaches to improving risk
allocation).
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ment, or B2G2G approach; this puts banking jurisdiction governments
squarely in the middle of the reporting system.
The FATCA implementation project should seek non-U.S. government cooperation. Despite the possibility that FFIs or local auditors might
adopt FATCA for reputational signaling reasons, the United States should
open the possibility of successful enforcement by presenting FATCA as a
model for automatic global information reporting and building other nations’ commitment to the project. The greater involvement of non-U.S.
governments could take several forms, including direct assumption of reporting responsibility, assistance in the project of reconciling FATCA’s requirements with client confidentiality rules, inclusion of FATCA
compliance in criteria for government inspection of non-U.S. banks or auditors, or adoption of parallel due diligence and/or reporting requirements. The 2012 FATCA framework agreed to by the United States,
France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, together with the negotiation over
intergovernmental agreements based on U.S.-drafted models, provides an
example of the kind of cooperative action possible under FATCA.
U.S. administrators of FATCA can use tactics based on simplicity, reciprocity, and side payments to encourage non-U.S. governments to support
the FATCA project. Existing model agreements make use of the reciprocity tactic and, to some extent, the simplicity tactic. FATCA administrators
might also use the simplicity, reciprocity, and side payment tactics in incremental and varied fashion in seeking the cooperation of different jurisdictions in the effort to build a global automatic tax reporting system.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss3/6

22

